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et al.: Private Loans

PRIVATE LOANS
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8."
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid
of any... private undertaking... or in aid of any
individual ....

N.Y. CONST. art.III, § 19:
The legislature shall neither audit nor allow any private claim
or account against the state, but may appropriatemoney to pay
such claims as shall have been audited and allowed according to
law. No claim against the state shall be audited, allowed or paid
which, as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse
of time. But if the claimant shall be under legal disability the
claim may be presented within two years after such disability is
removed.
COURT OF APPEALS
Ruotolo v. State of New York 1683
(decided February 17, 1994)
The state contended that the retroactive nature of General
Municipal Law section 205-a1 684 violated the New York State
Constitution, article VII, section 8,1685 which prohibited the state
from making a gift or loan of state money. 1686 Additionally, it
contended that the law violated article III, section 19, of the New
1683. 1994 WL 45627 (N.Y. Feb. 17, 1994).
1684. General Municipal Law section 205-a is an exception to the longstanding common law "fireman's rule" which prohibits firefighters from
recovering against a property owner based upon a negligence theory. See
Ruotolo v. State, 187 A.D.2d 160, 161-62, 593 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199, 203 (ist
Dep't 1993), aff'd, 1994 WL 45627 (1994).
1685. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8. The article provides in pertinent part:
"The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any ...
private undertaking... or in aid of any individual. ..

."

Id.

1686. Ruotolo, 1994 WL 45627, at *3.
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York State Constitution1 6 87 which governs the audit or allowance
of a time-barred claim. 1688 The court held that neither
constitutional provision was violated. 1689
In 1935, the New York State Legislature enacted General
Municipal Law section 205-a in an attempt to improve the
common law fireman's rule. 1690 General Municipal Law
section 205-a "provide[s] a cause of action for the injury to or
death of a firefighter in the line of duty caused 'directly or
indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable
negligence"' of anyone who does not comply with governing
orders or other related
rules,
statutes, ordinances,
requirements.

16 9 1

On February 14, 1984, Officers Ruotolo and Brathwaite
reported to a scene where a moped was allegedly stolen at
gunpoint. 1692 The two officers saw a person, George Agosto,
near a moped. 1693 As the officers exited their car, Agosto began
shooting at them, killing Ruotolo and seriously injuring
Brathwaite. 1694 Officer Brathwaite and the estate of Officer
Ruotolo brought suit against the State of New York alleging that
the state, via the Parole Board, was negligent in not revoking
Agosto's parole and incarcerating him. 1695 On September 2,
1988, the court of claims granted defendant state's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the claimants' theory of
1687. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 19. The article provides in pertinent part:
The legislature shall neither audit nor allow any private claim or account
against the state, but may appropriate money to pay such claims as shall
have been audited and allowed according to law. No claim against the

state shall be audited, allowed or paid which, as between citizens of the
state, would be barred by lapse of time. But if the claimant shall be
under legal disability the claim may be presented within two years after
such disability is removed.
Id.
1688. Ruotolo, 1994 WL 45627, at *3.
1689. Id. at *6-7.
1690. Ruotolo, 187 A.D.2d at 162, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 199.

1691. Id.
1692. Id. at 162-63, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
1693. Id. at 163, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
1694. Id.
1695.Id.
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negligence was barred by the public policy considerations of the
1696
original fireman's rule.
Claimants' appeal was still pending on July 12, 1989, when the

General Municipal Law was amended by section 205-e, which
extended the applicability of section 205-a to police officers. 1697
The appellate division affirmed the decision rendered by the court

of claims, but did not decide whether the statute was applicable
because the court found that the statute could not be applied

retroactively. 1698
The statute was amended again on July 22, 1990, to "revive

every cause of action for the personal injury or wrongful death of
a police officer which was pending or was dismissed on or after
January 1, 1987."1699 Claimants moved to reargue and vacate
summary judgment granted by the court of claims. 17 0 0 The court

denied this motion, reasoning that the legislative history
"confirms that [§ 205-e] is to be construed in pari materia with
section 205-a and that the statute and regulation allegedly violated

are not ones which deal with on-premises

safety

and

maintenance." 17 0 1 The claimants then appealed to the appellate
division and argued that this determination was incorrect. 17 0 2
1696. Id. at 163-64, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
1697. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-e (McKinney 1993). This section
provides in relevant part:
In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other
provision of law, in the event any accident, causing injury, death or a
disease which results in death, occurs directly or indirectly as a result of
any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or
persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes,
ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county,
village, town or city governments... the person or persons guilty of
said neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence at the time of such
injury or death shall be liable to pay any officer, member, agent or
employee of any police department ...

or to pay to the spouse and

children, or to pay the parents.., a sum of money ....
d.
1698.
1699.
1700.
1701.
1702.

Ruotolo, 187 A.D.2d at 164, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
Id.
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The appellate division stated that courts have not held that
"merely because the statute establishing such right is retroactive,
it is unconstitutional." 17 0 3
The New York Court of Appeals considered the constitutional
issues regarding the state making a gift or loan of state money
and the audit or allowance of a time-barred claim. 1704 In
deciding whether there was an article VII violation, the court
stated that it had previously found that the Legislature may make
use of public money to redress a wrong, even if no legal duty to
compensate existed, as long as it appeared that "not to act would
condone a travesty of justice. ' 1705 The court confirmed that if
the Legislature's decision was based upon a satisfactory moral
obligation, the nonprofit prohibition was not violated. 1706
The court determined that the legislative intent of the legislation
at issue was sufficient to support a moral objective. 1707
Additionally, in support of a moral obligation, the court looked
to the fact that the regeneration of these claims did not reward
judgment or give a direct gift of any forbidden state property. 1708
As the court eloquently stated, "[i]t is, in a governmental sense,
admirable that the law-enacting branches of government of the
state have persevered so diligently to satisfy a perceived moral
obligation to citizens for harms inflicted on them within a narrow
constitutionally permissible framework." 17 0 9

1703. Id. at 168, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (citing Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y.
134, 139, 184 N.E. 735 (1933)). Thus, the first department, by looking to the

legislative intent, noted that the amendment to provide for a retroactive cause
of action was not unconstitutional. Id. at 169-70, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 204-05. The
court further recognized that there is no federal or state constitutional
prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws within the United
States Constitution. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. The clause
states in pertinent part: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed." Id.
1704. Ruotolo, 1994 WL 45627 at *3.
1705. Id. at *5.
1706. Id.
1707. Id.
1708. Id.
1709. Id.
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In Farrington v. State, 17 10 the court of appeals delineated
examples of where a moral obligation may exist. 17 11 The court
stated:
Instances in which enactments, authorizing the allowance of
private claims, have been held to be constitutional, since it might
reasonably be said that the sanctioned claims involved moral
obligations, have been subject to classification under two
heads.. . . The second are claims involving injuries and
damages wrongfully inflicted upon individuals by those in the
State service or others for whose acts the State might justly be
17 12
regarded as responsible.
In conclusion, the court agreed with the finding of the appellate
court that the retroactive effect of General Municipal Law section
205-e was not violative of article III, section 19 of the New York
Constitution. 17 13 Thus the court affirmed the decision rendered
by the appellate division. 1714

1710. 248 N.Y. 112, 161 N.E. 438 (1928).
1711. Id. at 116, 161 N.E. at 440.
1712. Id.
1713. Id. See Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 139, 184 N.E. 735, 736

(1933) (holding that retrospective laws were not per se unconstitutional).
1714. Ruotolo, 1994 WL 45627, at *7.
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